The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

广西壮族自治区人民政府


广西壮族自治区人民政府关于修改《广西壮族自治区散装水泥管理规定》的决定


（2003年6月2日广西壮族自治区人民政府第6次常务会议审议通过 2003年6月16日广西壮族自治区人民政府令第1号公布）



自治区人民政府决定对《广西壮族自治区散装水泥管理规定》作如下修改：

一、第六条增加一款，作为第二款：“新建、扩建、改建水泥生产企业，新增散装水泥供应能力必须占新增水泥总产量70％以上。新增散装水泥供应能力未达到新增水泥总产量70％以上的，有关行政主管部门不得批准新建、扩建、改建水泥生产企业。”

二、第十条增加二款，作为第二款、第三款：“设区的市和有条件的县级市人民政府，应当组织计划、经贸、建设等有关行政主管部门按照国家和自治区有关规划和规定制定本市预拌混凝土发展计划，并组织实施。

设区的市和有条件的县级市人民政府应当根据本市预拌混凝土供应能力，确定本市必须使用预拌混凝土的具体区域和建设工程。在必须使用预拌混凝土的区域内的建设工程，不得在施工现场搅拌混凝土。”

三、第十一条第一款修改为：“下列建设工程和水泥制品生产者必须按照下列规定使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土：

（一）列入国家、自治区计划的重点建设工程使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土达90％以上；

2

（二）水泥用量在300吨以上或者房屋建筑面积在1500m 以上的其他建设工程，使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土达80％以上；

（三）水泥制品生产者全部使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土。”

删去第二款。

四、第十二条修改为：“按照本规定第十条、第十一条规定必须使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的建设工程，应当把使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的要求纳入施工招标文件和施工承包合同中。”

五、删去第十三条、第十四条。

六、第十七条改为第十五条，修改为：“袋装水泥生产企业（含水泥粉磨站，下同）和袋装水泥使用单位，应当按照国家和自治区有关规定缴纳散装水泥专项资金（以下简称专项资金）。禁止采取伪造、变造、隐匿、销毁水泥销售发票等欺骗手段不缴或者少缴专项资金。

除国家另有规定外，任何单位和个人不得擅自改变专项资金征收对象、扩大征收范围、提高征收标准或者减免专项资金。”

七、第十八条改为第十六条，第一款关于“柳州水泥厂、红水河水泥股份有限公司”的规定修改为：“广西鱼峰水泥集团公司、广西华润红水河水泥有限公司”。

删去第三款、第五款、第六款。

八、增加二条，分别作为第十七条、第十八条：

（一）“第十七条 列入国家、自治区计划的重点建设工程，建设单位应当缴纳的专项资金，由自治区散装水泥管理机构负责征收。其他袋装水泥使用单位应当缴纳的专项资金，由设区的市散装水泥管理机构负责征收。

工程建设使用袋装水泥的，由建设单位在工程开工前，按照建设概算预计水泥用量的一定比例向散装水泥管理机构或者其委托的发展计划、建设、交通、水利、电力等有关部门预缴专项资金，并在工程竣工之日起30日内凭有关部门批准的工程决算和购进散装水泥或者预拌混凝土原始凭证等资料，办理专项资金清算手续，实行多退少补。预缴专项资金的水泥用量的具体比例，由散装水泥管理机构根据建设工程实际情况确定。

建设工程使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土低于本规定第十一条第一款规定的比例的，预缴的专项资金不予退还。”

（二）“第十八条 袋装水泥生产企业缴纳的专项资金，在管理费用中列支。袋装水泥使用单位缴纳的专项资金，建设单位计入建安工程成本，水泥制品生产者在管理费用中列支。”

九、第十九条修改为：“应当缴纳专项资金的单位和个人必须于每月10日前缴纳上月应当缴纳的专项资金。自治区散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，应当按照自治区财政部门的规定全额缴入自治区国库。设区的市散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，除按实收总额的10％汇缴自治区散装水泥管理机构集中缴入自治区国库外，其余部分应当全额缴入同级国库。

散装水泥管理机构征收专项资金，必须持财政部门核发的《征集基金许可证》，使用自治区财政部门统一印制的政府性基金专用票据。”

十、删去第二十条。

十一、第二十一条改为第二十条，修改为：“散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金使用范围包括：

（一）新建、改建和扩建散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆专用设施；

（二）购置和维修散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆设备；

（三）散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆建设项目贷款贴息；

（四）散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆建设科研、新技术开发、示范与推广；

（五）发展散装水泥宣传；

（六）代征手续费；

（七）经同级财政部门批准的与发展散装水泥有关的其他开支。

前款第（一）、（二）、（三）、（四）项开支合计，不得少于当年专项资金支出总额的90％。”

十二、增加一条，作为第二十一条：“专项资金用于固定资产投资和更新改造的，作为增加国家资本金处理。”

十三、第二十二条第一款修改为：“散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，必须纳入财政预算，专款专用，实行收支两条线管理。禁止挤占、截留、挪用、私分专项资金。

各级散装水泥管理机构经同级编委核定为行政机关或者预算拨款事业单位的，其管理经费由同级财政部门按照编制从正常预算经费中核拨；目前仍为经费自理事业单位的，其管理经费由同级财政部门严格按照基本支出预算和项目支出预算管理规定，暂从专项资金中支付，今后逐步从正常经费中核拨。”

十四、增加一条，作为第二十三条：“专项资金征收、使用和管理的具体办法，由自治区财政部门、经济贸易管理部门根据财政部、国家经贸委《散装水泥专项资金征收和使用管理办法》（财综[2002]23号）另行制定。”

十五、第二十四条改为第二十五条，修改为：“违反本规定第十条第三款规定，在施工现场搅拌混凝土的，由建设行政主管部门按其现场搅拌的混凝土量处以每立方米30元以上50元以下的罚款，但罚款最高不得超过5万元。”

十六、增加一条，作为第二十六条：“未按本规定第十一条第一款规定使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的，由散装水泥管理部门对其低于规定比例的数量处以每吨20元的罚款，但罚款最高不得超过5万元。”

十七、第二十五条改为第二十七条，第一款修改为：“袋装水泥生产企业、使用单位未按时足额缴纳专项资金的，由散装水泥管理机构责令其限期补缴，并从滞纳之日起，按日加收滞纳专项资金0.5‰的滞纳金。逾期不补缴的，依照《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》第二十六条规定处以滞纳专项资金50％以下的罚款；采取伪造、变造、隐匿、销毁水泥销售发票等欺骗手段，不缴或者少缴应纳专项资金的，由散装水泥管理机构追缴其不缴或者少缴的专项资金、滞纳金，并依照《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》第二十六条规定处以不缴或者少缴的专项资金50％以上1倍以下的罚款。”

删去第二款。

十八、增加一条，作为第二十八条：“散装水泥管理机构和有关行政主管部门违反本规定，有下列行为之一的，依照《关于违反行政事业性收费和罚没收入收支两条线管理规定行政处分暂行规定》（国务院令第281号）、《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》和其他有关法律、法规的规定处理：

（一）擅自改变专项资金征收对象、扩大征收范围、提高征收标准或者减免专项资金的；

（二）不使用自治区财政部门统一印制的政府性基金专用票据征收专项资金的；

（三）挤占、截留、挪用、私分专项资金的；

（四）徇私舞弊或者玩忽职守，不征或者少征应征专项资金的。”

十九、第二十六条改为第二十九条，并删去其中的“从其收取的专项资金中提取3～5％”。

此外，根据本决定对部分条文的文字作相应修改，并对条文顺序作相应调整。

本决定自2003年8月1日起施行。

《广西壮族自治区散装水泥管理规定》根据本决定作相应修正，重新公布。



附：广西壮族自治区散装水泥管理规定（2003年修正本）

（1996年10月25日自治区人民政府令第6号发布 根据2003年6月16日《广西壮族自治区人民政府关于修改〈广西壮族自治区散装水泥管理规定〉的决定》修正）

第一条 为加快发展散装水泥，节约资源，促进技术进步，改善生产条件，减少环境污染，保证建设工程质量，提高经济效益和社会效益，根据国家有关规定，结合本自治区实际情况，制定本规定。

第二条 在本自治区行政区域内从事水泥生产、经营、运输、中转、使用、管理的单位和个人必须遵守本规定。

第三条 自治区散装水泥管理机构负责全自治区散装水泥管理工作，并具体组织实施本规定。

设区的市散装水泥管理机构负责本行政区域内的散装水泥管理工作，并接受上级散装水泥管理机构的业务指导。

第四条 各级散装水泥管理机构的主要职责是：

（一）贯彻执行国家和自治区发展散装水泥法律、法规、规章和政策；

（二）编制散装水泥发展规划和年度计划，并组织实施；

（三）按规定征收、管理和使用散装水泥专项资金；

（四）负责散装水泥工作的信息交流、宣传教育、技术培训、统计和新技术、新工艺、新设备的推广应用；

（五）协同有关部门做好预拌混凝土的推广应用工作；

（六）协调解决发展散装水泥工作中出现的问题。

第五条 各级人民政府应当加强对发展散装水泥管理工作的组织领导。

各级财政、金融、物价、建设、铁路、交通、公安、乡镇企业、税务、统计、质量技术监督、环境保护等部门，应当按照各自的职责，配合散装水泥管理机构做好发展散装水泥的管理工作。

第六条 水泥生产企业，特别是立窑生产企业应当采用先进技术，确保散装水泥符合国家规定的各项质量标准。

新建、扩建、改建水泥生产企业，新增散装水泥供应能力必须占新增水泥总产量70％以上。新增散装水泥供应能力未达到新增水泥总产量70％以上的，有关行政主管部门不得批准新建、扩建、改建水泥生产企业。

第七条 各级散装水泥管理机构和水泥生产企业、使用单位应当按照国家和自治区的有关规定，及时、准确地报送财务或者水泥产量、散装量以及水泥用量的统计报表。

第八条 生产、装卸、使用、储存散装水泥的单位和个人，必须确保其散装水泥设施、设备符合安全和环境保护的要求，并严格执行计量管理的规定。

第九条 建设行政主管部门应当在建设工程预算定额中，将施工企业购置使用散装水泥设施、设备的费用列入建设工程造价。

第十条 预拌混凝土搅拌站必须全部使用散装水泥。

设区的市和有条件的县级市人民政府，应当组织计划、经贸、建设等有关行政主管部门按照国家和自治区有关规划和规定制定本市预拌混凝土发展计划，并组织实施。

设区的市和有条件的县级市人民政府应当根据本市预拌混凝土供应能力，确定本市必须使用预拌混凝土的具体区域和建设工程。在必须使用预拌混凝土的区域内的建设工程，不得在施工现场搅拌混凝土。

第十一条 下列建设工程和水泥制品生产者必须按照下列规定使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土：

（一）列入国家、自治区计划的重点建设工程使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土达90％以上；

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（二）水泥用量在300吨以上或者房屋建筑面积在1500m 以上的其他建设工程，使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土达80％以上；

（三）水泥制品生产者全部使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土。

必须使用散装水泥的建设工程，因客观情况确实不能按规定比例使用散装水泥、预拌混凝土的，经自治区散装水泥管理机构批准，可不使用散装水泥、预拌混凝土或者降低散装水泥、预拌混凝土的使用比例。

第十二条 按照本规定第十条、第十一条规定必须使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的建设工程，应当把使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的要求纳入施工招标文件和施工承包合同中。

第十三条 散装水泥专用车和预拌混凝土搅拌车进入市和城镇的交通控制路段时，公安部门应当给予办理通行手续，提供行车便利，保障建设工程正常施工。

第十四条 交通部门对散装水泥专用车、预拌混凝土搅拌车和散装水泥船舶征收的有关规费，应当按照国家和自治区人民政府的有关规定给予优惠。

第十五条 袋装水泥生产企业（含水泥粉磨站，下同）和袋装水泥使用单位，应当按照国家和自治区有关规定缴纳散装水泥专项资金（以下简称专项资金）。禁止采取伪造、变造、隐匿、销毁水泥销售发票等欺骗手段不缴或者少缴专项资金。

除国家另有规定外，任何单位和个人不得擅自改变专项资金征收对象、扩大征收范围、提高征收标准或者减免专项资金。

第十六条 广西鱼峰水泥集团公司、广西华润红水河水泥有限公司缴纳的专项资金，由自治区散装水泥管理机构负责征收。

铁路系统的水泥厂应当缴纳的专项资金，由自治区散装水泥管理机构委托铁路管理部门代征。

其他水泥生产企业应当缴纳的专项资金，由设区的市散装水泥管理机构负责征收。

第十七条 列入国家、自治区计划的重点建设工程，建设单位应当缴纳的专项资金，由自治区散装水泥管理机构负责征收。其他袋装水泥使用单位应当缴纳的专项资金，由设区的市散装水泥管理机构负责征收。

工程建设使用袋装水泥的，由建设单位在工程开工前，按照建设概算预计水泥用量的一定比例向散装水泥管理机构或者其委托的发展计划、建设、交通、水利、电力等有关部门预缴专项资金，并在工程竣工之日起30日内凭有关部门批准的工程决算和购进散装水泥或者预拌混凝土原始凭证等资料，办理专项资金清算手续，实行多退少补。预缴专项资金的水泥用量的具体比例，由散装水泥管理机构根据建设工程实际情况确定。

建设工程使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土低于本规定第十一条第一款规定的比例的，预缴的专项资金不予退还。

第十八条 袋装水泥生产企业缴纳的专项资金，在管理费用中列支。袋装水泥使用单位缴纳的专项资金，建设单位计入建安工程成本，水泥制品生产者在管理费用中列支。

第十九条 应当缴纳专项资金的单位和个人必须于每月10日前缴纳上月应当缴纳的专项资金。自治区散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，应当按照自治区财政部门的规定全额缴入自治区国库。设区的市散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，除按实收总额的10％汇缴自治区散装水泥管理机构集中缴入自治区国库外，其余部分应当全额缴入同级国库。

散装水泥管理机构征收专项资金，必须持财政部门核发的《征集基金许可证》，使用自治区财政部门统一印制的政府性基金专用票据。

第二十条 散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金使用范围包括：

（一）新建、改建和扩建散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆专用设施；

（二）购置和维修散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆设备；

（三）散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆建设项目贷款贴息；

（四）散装水泥、预拌混凝土、预拌砂浆建设科研、新技术开发、示范与推广；

（五）发展散装水泥宣传；

（六）代征手续费；

（七）经同级财政部门批准的与发展散装水泥有关的其他开支。

前款第（一）、（二）、（三）、（四）项开支合计，不得少于当年专项资金支出总额的90％。

第二十一条 专项资金用于固定资产投资和更新改造的，作为增加国家资本金处理。

第二十二条 散装水泥管理机构征收的专项资金，必须纳入财政预算管理，专款专用，实行收支两条线管理。禁止挤占、截留、挪用、私分专项资金。

各级散装水泥管理机构经同级编委核定为行政机关或者预算拨款事业单位的，其管理经费由同级财政部门按照编制从正常预算经费中核拨；目前仍为经费自理事业单位的，其管理经费由同级财政部门严格按照基本支出预算和项目支出预算管理规定，暂从专项资金中支付，今后逐步从正常经费中核拨。

各级财政和审计等部门应当加强对专项资金征收、管理和使用情况的监督和检查。

第二十三条 专项资金征收、使用和管理的具体办法，由自治区财政部门、经济贸易管理部门根据财政部、国家经贸委《散装水泥专项资金征收和使用管理办法》（财综[2002]23号）另行制定。

第二十四条 违反本规定第六、七、八条有关规定的，由有关部门依法处理。

第二十五条 违反本规定第十条第三款规定，在施工现场搅拌混凝土的，由建设行政主管部门按其现场搅拌的混凝土量处以每立方米30元以上50元以下的罚款，但罚款最高不得超过5万元。

第二十六条 未按本规定第十一条第一款规定使用散装水泥或者预拌混凝土的，由散装水泥管理部门对其低于规定比例的数量处以每吨20元的罚款，但罚款最高不得超过5万元。

第二十七条 袋装水泥生产企业、使用单位未按时足额缴纳专项资金的，由散装水泥管理机构责令其限期补缴，并从滞纳之日起，按日加收滞纳专项资金0.5‰的滞纳金。逾期不补缴的，依照《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》第二十六条规定处以滞纳专项资金50％以下的罚款；采取伪造、变造、隐匿、销毁水泥销售发票等欺骗手段，不缴或者少缴应纳专项资金的，由散装水泥管理机构追缴其不缴或者少缴的专项资金、滞纳金，并依照《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》第二十六条规定处以不缴或者少缴的专项资金50％以上1倍以下的罚款。

第二十八条 散装水泥管理机构和有关行政主管部门违反本规定，有下列行为之一的，依照《关于违反行政事业性收费和罚没收入收支两条线管理规定行政处分暂行规定》（国务院令第281号）、《广西壮族自治区行政事业性收费管理条例》和其他有关法律、法规的规定处理：

（一）擅自改变专项资金征收对象、扩大征收范围、提高征收标准或者减免专项资金的；

（二）不使用自治区财政部门统一印制的政府性基金专用票据征收专项资金的；

（三）挤占、截留、挪用、私分专项资金的；

（四）徇私舞弊或者玩忽职守，不征或者少征应征专项资金的。

第二十九条 对发展散装水泥有突出贡献的有关单位和个人，由散装水泥管理机构给予表彰或者奖励。具体办法由自治区散装水泥管理机构另行制定。

第三十条 本规定自1997年1月1日起施行。过去自治区有关政策与本规定不一致的，按照本规定执行。